The last time I wrote about Brexit was on 31 January 2020. That was the official date of the U.K.’s divorce from Europe and the start of 11 months of transitioning to something else.[i]
All 12 of the pandemic articles that I have published since March have gone viral thanks to a Covid-19 setting. The opportunity now is to bookend 2020 with another look at our place in Europe. Symmetry might give an impression of order at the end of a chaotic year – to take back control? Wishful thinking, probably.
Flash back 12 months to December 2019. The U.K’s undervalued nurses in the underfunded NHS took the unprecedented action of going on strike. And the Government with a new PM - the Conservative Party’s third leader in three years – called a pre-Christmas General Election in pursuit of the U.K’s quest for sovereignty.
Just three months into Westminster’s new Parliament Covid-19 struck, gradually absorbing everybody’s attention month by month almost to the exclusion of all else.
Agreeing on a Deal
As deadlines for reaching a trade deal at Halloween came and went, continuing right up to Christmas Eve, it was looking a lot like Christmas Brexit would ring in the New Year with crashing alarms bells. Britain wanted access to the EU Single Market, its largest trading partner, at the same time as keeping itself sovereign beyond the control of the European Court of Justice.
A Brussels-based journalist[ii] explained the mutual exclusivity of Britain’s twin aims. On 24 June 2016 when the Brexit referendum result was announced, the President of the European Council advised the 27 EU leaders that the U.K. would have to decide how many obligations it accepts to enjoy the rights of single market access. This became known as the “level playing field.”
Subsequently, in October 2019 Brussels and London published the Joint Political Declaration agreeing to the definition of that term. Both agreed to uphold the common high standards in state aid, competition, social and employment standards, environment, climate change and taxation. One recalls the rhetorical vassalage being projected by PM Johnson to complain about being bound by the rules it has no voice in making.
Fortunately the worst case prospect of a chaotic crash-out will not happen. Literally at the eleventh hour, compromises were reached on the outstanding issues of the level playing field and of fisheries. The EU was able to publish a 1,246 page tome late on Christmas Eve detailing the trade deal, with the U.K now recognised as a third country.
On Christmas Day the EU’s chief negotiator briefed ambassadors in Brussels about the deal. The next day, the U.K Government Minister Michael Gove with the imposing title Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster wrote an article in the Times[iii] about the great future ahead for the U.K. In full rhetorical flow he wrote that
“the greatest prize is the chance to renew our country and help it recover from the ravages of Covid-19...to spread opportunity more equally across the U.K....with a good trade deal we can tackle the injustices and inequalities that have held Britain back...”
Pause for a moment to assess Mr Gove’s new objectives. On the one hand, his ambiguities - either intentional or accidental - in connecting Britain’s EU membership with its handling of the pandemic and also to Britain’s north/south rich/poor inequalities are worrying. On the other hand, it’s refreshing to hear a senior Minister admitting that he has
“made more than (his) share of mistakes or misjudgements through the past four years...”
Two questions arise from Mr Gove’s declaration. Firstly, could his confession of mistakes include the absurdity of his referendum campaign claim that U.K voters are sick of experts, used as an excuse to discredit empirical evidence of Brexit’s adverse consequences? And secondly, how exactly is the so-called levelling-up agenda related to the U.K’s leaving the EU? Action to address regional and other inequalities has always been a cornerstone of European polity. The U.K. doesn’t have to wait to leave the EU before tackling domestic problems.
Give and take
The path to achieving agreement and an orderly exit has necessitated compromises. The UK, for example, conceded on the PM Johnson’s “go whistle” taunt about not having to pay a divorce bill, the sum being £39 billion. Another was PM Johnson conceding on PM May’s “threat to the UK’s constitutional integrity” by agreeing to keep Northern Ireland within the EU customs territory covering goods, resulting in customs and regulatory checks between Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
A year ago Northern Ireland’s only pro-Brexit party, the DUP, dubbed Westminster’s Withdrawal Act as the “betrayal act” on the grounds that the UK Government signed up to “a border in the Irish Sea.” Nevertheless, UK/EU agreement was eventually reached about the protocol’s detail in the closing weeks of negotiations, just ahead of the eventual sticking points - the level playing field and fisheries.
In the final days of negotiations, the reality of the U.K’s ability to take control of its borders as a sovereign nation was exposed by a non-Brexit matter. A mutation of the coronavirus estimated to be 70% more contagious than the original was discovered in Britain. As a result, one by one all EU countries closed their borders to British traffic to protect public health. This was an example of sovereign nations acting independently of each other. It was not a good look internationally for the port of Dover as it wilted under enormous pressure to take control at the end of the nation’s transition.
Press reaction
Reacting promptly to the deal, the journalist Max Hastings made some apposite comments,[iv] such as
· questioning the PM’s assertion about taking back control – of what, he asks, since our vast service sector remains at the EU mercy;
· Britain, he argues, will become progressively poorer than it would have had we retained EU membership. This chimes with data from the UK Government’s forecaster, the Office for Budget Responsibility, which estimates that the UK/EU trade deal will cost 4% in permanently lost GDP;
· exporters and importers will face a blizzard of new paperwork and red-tape costs;
· we shall become less important allies for the US because of our forfeiture of influence in Europe;
· we shall have no power to influence on new EU decisions on trade, environmental and health standards; and
· our new-found independence does nothing to resolve non-EU immigration.
Two of these points chime with Fintan O’Toole’s analysis. The one about losing international influence echoes the comment[v] about Britain’s “unique loss as a free country negotiating itself out of a position of influence to one of vulnerability;” and likewise his comments about powerlessness over EU decision-making on standards echoes O’Toole’s conclusion[vi] that “the trade deal ensures that there is no clean break, Britain is wedded to current EU standards.”
The first journalistic reaction which I read, and even quicker out of the blocks than Max Hastings, was the London correspondent of the New York Times.[vii] He describes how
· British distributors are scrambling with less than a week to prepare the first of thousands of new export certificates to allow meat fish and dairy to be sold to the EU. Coincidentally Michael Gove issued unprecedented warnings (28 Dec) about having paperwork in order, or otherwise do not travel;
· British food businesses now face the same burdensome checks as European imports from Chile or Australia;
· Echoing Max Hastings, but with added quantification, he explains how Britain’s services sector was largely left out of the 1246 page deal despite accounting for 80% of British economic activity. Britain sells $40 billion of financial services to the EU annually profiting from an integrated market.
· Britain ran a surplus of £24 billion on trade in financial and other services with the EU in 2019 but a deficit of $129 billion on goods’ trading; and
· he quotes the former director of the Institute for Public Policy Research who says that the EU retains all of its current advantages in trading especially with goods while the UK loses all of its current advantages in the trade for services.
How can it be that the U.K. has omitted its largest business sector from the deal? This omission sounds like a fatal flaw in the agreement. How can Westminster claim that the U.K economy will prosper from 1 January 2021?
Miscellaneous points
Pundits predict that “the devil will be in the detail.” A flavour of this follows.
The Times policy editor reveals[viii] that
· it will become harder for UK citizens to work in the EU because UK qualifications will no longer be recognised in the EU. Is this a good thing?
· higher costs for the transfer of animal products from the UK to the EU are likely because the EU did not agree to recognise UK standards as equivalent to theirs. Is this a good thing for the UK?
· the UK agreed to follow EU rules on road transport such as the hours allowed to be worked by drivers;
· whereas the UK will no longer take part in the EU-wide Erasmus university exchange programme, Northern Ireland students can continue to participate with their fees paid by the Irish Government. Given the DUP’s policy on regulatory NI/GB alignment, will they support this concession?
· the UK can exchange information from the EU criminal records database without oversight from the ECJ, but will have to follow EU rules on the exchange of air passenger name records.
An analysis by the Observer of unresolved issues[ix] includes comment that
· “Britain’s law enforcement apparatus is diminished (under the deal).” This conclusion is based on two security matters;
· UK policing has forfeited its use of the Shengen Information Systems (SIS), the database with real-time alerts to locate serious criminals and terrorists. On average, British police access SIS more than 1.65 million times daily;
· the UK is losing its seat on Europol, the EU’s policing agency;
· The Observer also highlights the need to negotiate a deal for services which has been left out of the deal.
Parliament may have approved the rushed UK/EU Brexit deal with little scrutiny or evidence of taking control. U.K. citizens are entitled to ask if this trade deal will best serve Britain’s national interest – never mind those of its neighbours.
What price sovereignty?
©Michael McSorley 2020
Postscript:-
This Brexit series comprises of the following articles:-
Brexit 25 July 2016[x]
Global Populism 27 Feb 2017[xi]
Brexit 14 Months On 30 August 2017[xii]
Our Precious Union 29 August 2018[xiii]
Arguments for/against Brexit as Parliament debates UK/EU Deal 7 December 2018[xiv]
Brexit Briefings to DUP MP Jan/Feb 2019 5 March 2019[xv]
Brexit lampooned 27 April 2019[xvi]
How can the UK’s new PM resolve the Brexit conundrum? 23 July 2019[xvii]
Omnes ad Unum Conservatives and DUP 24 September 2019[xviii]
Election Communication 8 December 2019[xix]
Leaving Britain Undone 31 January 2020[xx]
The Price of Sovereignty 30 December 2020
[i] https://michaelmcsorleyeconomy.blogspot.com/2020/01/brexit-leaving-britain-undone.html
[ii] Tony Connolly RTE.ie “The level playing field: Brexit for slow learners” 12 December 2020
[iii] The Times 26 December 2020 Michael Gove “We have taken back control, now we can level up at home”
[iv] The Times 26 December 2020 Max Hastings “Brexit leaves more questions than answers”
[v] The Irish Times 19 December 2020 Fintan O’Toole “Let Britain think it’s great”
[vi] The Irish Times December 29 2020 Fintan O’Toole “Brexit was based on fantasies of triggering EU’s dinintegration”
[vii] New York Times 25 December 2020 Benjamin Mueller “Brexit Deal Done, Britain Now Scrambles to See How It Will Work”
[viii] The Times 26 December 2020 Oliver Wright “How Britain and Europe agreed to differ”
[ix] Observer 27 December 2020 “The deal is finally done – but many crucial issues still remain unresolved”
[x] https://michaelmcsorleyeconomy.blogspot.com/2016/07/brexit.html
[xi] https://michaelmcsorleyeconomy.blogspot.com/2017/02/global-populism.html
[xii] https://michaelmcsorleyeconomy.blogspot.com/2017/08/brexit-14-months-on.html
[xiii] https://michaelmcsorleyeconomy.blogspot.com/2018/08/our-precious-union.html
[xiv] https://michaelmcsorleyeconomy.blogspot.com/2018/12/arguments-for-and-against-brexit-as.html
[xv] https://michaelmcsorleyeconomy.blogspot.com/2019/03/brexit-briefings-to-dup-mp-jan-feb-2019.html
[xvi] https://michaelmcsorleyeconomy.blogspot.com/2019/04/brexit-lampooned.html
[xvii] https://michaelmcsorleyeconomy.blogspot.com/2019/07/how-can-uks-new-pm-resolve-brexit.html
[xviii] https://michaelmcsorleyeconomy.blogspot.com/2019/09/omnes-ad-unum-conservatives-and-dup.html
[xix] https://michaelmcsorleyeconomy.blogspot.com/2019/12/election-communication.html
[xx] https://michaelmcsorleyeconomy.blogspot.com/2020/01/brexit-leaving-britain-undone.html
